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INTRODUCTION
On January 19, 2012, the Department of Justice charged seven
individuals and two corporations with organizing an international criminal
enterprise through the website Megaupload.com.1 Pursuant to these
charges, at the U.S. Government’s request, New Zealand law enforcement
officials arrested Megaupload founder and CEO Kim Dotcom at his home.2
The police raid on Dotcom’s home involved over 70 officers armed with
M-4 automatic rifles and body armor.3 Dotcom and Megaupload were not
charged with any violent crime, but with “engaging in a racketeering
conspiracy, conspiring to commit copyright infringement, conspiring to
commit money laundering, and two substantive counts of criminal
copyright infringement.”4 The file-sharing site claimed that it complied
with the law by obeying “notice and takedown” procedures in accordance
with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) safe harbor whenever
rights-holders notified it of infringing material posted on the site.5 Despite
its compliance with these takedown requests, Megaupload.com was one of
the most visited sites in the world.6 The source of the site’s popularity was
its reputation for permitting the posting of copyrighted materials.7
The Justice Department executed a number of arrest warrants, as well
as twenty search warrants, in the United States and eight other countries.8
During the raid on Dotcom’s home, the Megaupload servers were shut
down.9 As a part of this action, the Justice Department seized $50 million
1

Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Charges Leaders of Megaupload
with Widespread Online Copyright Infringement (Jan. 19, 2012), http://goo.gl/F3ZjXf.
2
Greg Sandoval, Guns, Body Armor, and Raids: The Piracy Fight Gets Dangerous,
CNET (Feb. 6, 2012), http://goo.gl/czWdOs.
3
Id.
4
Press Release, supra note 1.
5
The DMCA is a 1998 federal law that amended U.S. copyright statutes, inter alia, to
create vicarious liability for those who facilitate the posting of infringing material on the
internet. Digital Millennium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (2006)). It also established a safe
harbor for alleged infringers: if they remove allegedly infringing materials upon request by
the copyright-holder, they can immunize themselves from suit. See generally Edward Lee,
Decoding the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233 (2009) (discussing the
efficacy of the DCMA safe harbors and when an Internet service provider (ISP) has a duty to
remove infringing material, along with providing guidance to the courts and Congress for
future amendments to the DMCA and its current interpretation).
6
Timothy B. Lee, Civil Asset Forfeiture and Intellectual Property, CATO UNBOUND
(Jan. 9, 2013), http://goo.gl/ZJU2uB; see also Press Release, supra note 1.
7
Press Release, supra note 1.
8
Id.
9
Timothy B. Lee, How the Criminalization of Copyright Threatens Innovation and the Rule
of Law, in COPYRIGHT UNBALANCED: FROM INCENTIVE TO EXCESS 55, 65 (Jerry Brito ed., 2012).
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in assets and completely removed them from the defendant’s control.10
Federal prosecutors subsequently objected to unfreezing a portion of these
funds so that the defendant could hire attorneys.11 The cumulative result of
prosecutors’ actions was clear: “[Kim Dotcom’s] business has been
effectively destroyed before he sets foot inside a courtroom.”12
Of particular concern in this ordeal was that providing
Megaupload.com a legal defense would require settling unresolved and
complicated copyright questions—certainly ones that would demand the
services of experienced copyright attorneys.13 Whether a party can be held
criminally liable for inducing third parties to infringe copyright—known as
secondary infringement—was central to the matter.14 Although the
Supreme Court has established that secondary copyright infringement gives
rise to civil liability,15 the Court has not yet extended this doctrine to
criminal liability.16 Because the Government’s case was on such shaky
ground, it was clear from the beginning that the quality of Megaupload’s
legal counsel would be outcome-determinative.17 Aside from these novel
questions of law, the facts of the case are “hugely complex” and involve
petabytes of data.18

10
Nate Anderson, Why the Feds Smashed Megaupload, ARS TECHNICA (Jan. 19, 2012),
http://goo.gl/eS6kHS; see also Indictment at 66–71, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-CR-3
(E.D. Va. Jan. 5, 2012) (listing all the defendants’ assets subject to forfeiture).
11
[Proposed] Motion to Challenge the Scope of Pretrial Restraint of Assets of Defendants
Megaupload Limited, Kim Dotcom, Mathias Ortmann, Bram Van Der Kolk & Finn Batato and
Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof at 4, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12-CR-3 (E.D.
Va. May 30, 2012) [hereinafter Defendants’ Motion to Challenge the Scope] (“[T]he
Government has also deprived Megaupload of its right to counsel by freezing all of its
worldwide assets, then refusing to agree to unfreeze one penny to fund defense efforts. . . .”).
12
Lee, supra note 9, at 67.
13
Timothy B. Lee, Government Trying to Deny Megaupload Fair Legal Representation,
ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 15, 2012), http://goo.gl/xRJ0WP.
14
Jennifer Granick, Megaupload: A Lot Less Guilty than You Think, CTR. FOR INTERNET
AND SOC’Y (Jan. 26, 2012, 11:47 AM), http://goo.gl/Woqjfi.
15
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936–37 (2005)
(“[T]he inducement rule, too, is a sensible one for copyright. We adopt it here, holding that
one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as
shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable
for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”).
16
See Granick, supra note 14.
17
Id. (“[P]rosecuting this case against Mega, especially if Defendants get good criminal
lawyers who also understand copyright law, is going to be an uphill battle for the government.”).
18
Defendants’ Motion to Challenge the Scope, supra note 11, at 2. A single petabyte is a
truly enormous amount of data, capable of storing 500 billion pages of printed text. Megabytes,
Gigabytes, Terabytes . . . What Are They?, WHAT’S A BYTE?, http://goo.gl/oJrpbn (last visited
Dec. 28, 2013).
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Without the frozen $50 million in assets, the company and the
individuals indicted would be unable to afford a legal defense.19 Given the
novel questions of law involved, it is counter to the public interest (and
most certainly counter to Megaupload’s interests) to have such an
enormously complicated case be resolved by overworked and underpaid
public defenders.20 More bizarre is the idea that public defenders’ already
scarce resources should be redirected from indigent defendants to a
defendant who has the means to pay for his own legal defense—that the
Government should impose indigence upon Megaupload.
The law firm Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan sought to represent
Megaupload in the criminal trial.21 The attorneys argued that “[i]f the
Government is to have its way, the only evidence available to the Court
would be that [evidence] cherry-picked by the Government . . . .
Megaupload will never get its day in Court and the case will effectively be
over before it has even begun.”22 Megaupload’s prospective attorneys
further argued that the Government’s imposition of secondary criminal
liability was unprecedented and unlikely to succeed.23
Still, the
Government was able to successfully freeze Megaupload’s assets.24
The Megaupload case illustrates the burgeoning use of forfeiture law
in the United States. In the 1970s, Congress passed as parts of other
legislation the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act

19

Id at 12–13.

By the Government’s design, all available assets for the defense have been seized and frozen, as the
Government well knows. The limited allotments Mr. Dotcom is receiving (by order of a New
Zealand court) are reserved for his living expenses and those of his family and cannot be used to
cover legal expenses, as is already a matter of record before this Court. All of the legal work
performed to date by the undersigned has gone without recompense. The Government has effectively
acknowledged the Defendants’ inability to pay for attorneys in proposing release of frozen funds for
the narrow purpose of preserving servers. For present purposes, therefore, there should be no dispute
that Defendants are in fact unable to fund their defense absent the requested relief.

Id. (internal citation omitted).
20
See Stephen B. Bright & Sia M. Sanneh, Fifty Years of Defiance and Resistance After
Gideon v. Wainwright, 122 YALE L.J. 2150, 2156 (2013) (“[T]he lawyer assigned to defend
a poor person usually has little or no time and few resources to investigate the charges and
mount a defense.”).
21
Lee, supra note 13.
22
Rebuttal Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Motion of Quinn Emanuel
Urquhart & Sullivan LLP and the Rothken Law Firm for Leave to Enter Limited Appearance
on Behalf of Megaupload Limited and Kim Dotcom at 1, United States v. Dotcom, No. 1:12CR-3 (E.D. Va. Apr. 12, 2012).
23
Id. at 16.
24
Timothy B. Lee, Asset Forfeiture Abuse Threatens Fair Trial in Copyright Case,
CATO INST. (April 16, 2012, 8:26 AM), http://goo.gl/ScGyEi.
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(RICO)25 and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) statute,26 which
both include criminal asset forfeiture provisions.27 In order to bolster the
effectiveness of these forfeiture provisions, Congress later passed the
Comprehensive Forfeiture Act (CFA).28 As a result of the CFA, the Justice
Department was granted the power to seize forfeitable assets before trial, so
long as there was “probable cause to believe that the property is subject to
forfeiture.”29 The statute itself provides for no adversarial hearing, pre- or
post-restraint, to determine the propriety of the asset seizure.30
While these forfeiture statutes were originally aimed at organized
crime and the drug trade, the Megaupload case shows that the use of the
tool has expanded. As time has gone by, more and more offenses have
become forfeitable.31 The forfeiture device itself was originally expanded
to combat the perception that organized crime was profitable.32 Today, it is
used indiscriminately and in a way that deprives defendants of a meaningful
legal defense.
Another critical element of this problem is financial. In 1986, the
second year after the creation of the Department of Justice Asset Forfeiture
Fund, the Fund received $93.7 million.33 In 2008, the Asset Forfeiture
25
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922, 941–
48 (codified as amended as the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18
U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012)).
26
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 408,
84 Stat. 1236, 1265 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 848, 853 (2006 & Supp. 2009)).
27
18 U.S.C. § 1963(b); 21 U.S.C. § 848(a); see also Max M. Nelson, Note, Federal
Forfeiture and Money Laundering: Undue Deference to Legal Fictions and the Canadian
Crossroads, 41 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 43, 47–50 (2009).
28
18 U.S.C. § 981; Nelson, supra note 27, at 48–49.
29
18 U.S.C. § 981(b)(2)(B).
30
United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012).
31
See Nelson, supra note 27, at 49–50. Originally applied to RICO cases, Congress
expanded forfeiture to apply to money laundering and then any property “involved in”
money laundering.
32
See S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 191 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3374.

Title III of the bill (Sections 301-323) is designed to enhance the use of forfeiture, and in
particular, the sanction of criminal forfeiture, as a law enforcement tool in combatting two of the
most serious crimes facing the country: racketeering and drug trafficking. Profit is the
motivation for this criminal activity, and it is through economic power that it is sustained and
grows. More than ten years ago, the Congress recognized in its enactment of statutes specifically
addressing organized crime and illegal drugs that the conviction of individual racketeers and
drug dealers would be of only limited effectiveness if the economic power bases of criminal
organizations or enterprises were left intact, and so included forfeiture authority designed to strip
these offenders and organizations of their economic power.

Id. (internal citation omitted).
33
MARIAN R. WILLIAMS ET AL., INST. FOR JUSTICE, POLICING FOR PROFIT: THE ABUSE OF
CIVIL ASSET FORFEITURE 11 (2010).
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Fund exceeded $1 billion in net assets.34 This Comment demonstrates that
financial incentives for investigating and prosecuting forfeitable offenses
have the utterly predictable effect of increasing said investigations and
prosecutions.35
Part I of this Comment discusses the Supreme Court’s firm rejection of
an exception to the CFA for the payment of attorney’s fees,36 although the
Court left open the possibility of courts using a pretrial procedure to help
protect defendants from improper forfeiture.37 Part II discusses the two
main approaches the circuit courts take in formulating a pretrial procedure
for determining the propriety of a forfeiture action. The D.C. and Second
Circuits have taken the view that these hearings should encompass the
questions of (1) whether the forfeitable assets are rightly traceable to illegal
activity and (2) whether the government can prove that there is probable
cause that an offense took place.38 In contrast, the Eleventh Circuit has held
that such a hearing can only address the former.39 Part III introduces
evidence and argument questioning the assumptions made by the Eleventh
Circuit in denying defendants a full pretrial hearing.40 Part IV then argues
that the D.C. and Second Circuits’ approach more adequately protects the
serious interests involved in pretrial restraint of assets and that the
increasing problem of the overuse of federal forfeiture statutes should be of
paramount importance in these matters. On those grounds, Part IV argues
that the Supreme Court should adopt the D.C. and Second Circuit’s
approach in Kaley v. United States.
I. ATTORNEY’S FEE FORFEITURE IN THE LATE 1980S
In 1989 companion decisions, the Supreme Court took up the question
of whether a criminal defendant has the right to use forfeitable assets to pay
attorney’s fees.41 In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, the
34

Id.
None of the foregoing is intended to disparage law enforcement officials or
prosecutors. To the contrary, it simply proves that they are subject to the same incentives as
anybody else. The problem lies not with those carrying out the forfeiture but rather the
incentive structure created by current forfeiture law.
36
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 632 (1989) (“We
therefore reject petitioner’s claim of a Sixth Amendment right of criminal defendants to use
assets that are the Government’s—assets adjudged forfeitable, as Reckmeyer’s were—to pay
attorney’s fees . . . .”).
37
United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto III), 491 U.S. 600, 615 n.10 (1989).
38
See United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 417, 421 (D.C. Cir. 2008); United
States v. Monsanto (Monsanto IV), 924 F.2d 1186, 1196, 1203 (2d Cir. 1991).
39
See United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1317 (11th Cir. 2012).
40
Id.
41
See Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619 (5–4 decision); Monsanto III, 491 U.S. at 602.
35
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defendant, Christopher Reckmeyer, had been indicted for importing and
distributing illegal narcotics.42 The indictment charged that Reckmeyer’s
activities constituted a continuing criminal enterprise in violation of federal
law.43 Pursuant to federal criminal forfeiture law,44 the indictment
authorized forfeiture of a range of Reckmeyer’s assets.45 Subsequently, the
district court issued a restraining order freezing his potentially forfeitable
assets.46
By the time Reckmeyer was indicted, he had already retained an
attorney, who subsequently moved for permission to use restrained assets
for legal fees and to exempt his fees from postconviction forfeiture.47
Unfortunately for Reckmeyer’s attorney, Reckmeyer reached a plea
agreement with the prosecutor before the question of the forfeitability of his
fees could be resolved—Reckmeyer’s assets were forfeited as a part of the
agreement.48
Reckmeyer’s attorney, the petitioner in Caplin & Drysdale, argued,
inter alia, that the lack of an exemption for attorney’s fees in the federal
forfeiture statue impinged upon Reckmeyer’s Sixth Amendment right to
counsel as well as his Fifth Amendment right to a balance of power
between the government and the accused.49 The Fourth Circuit affirmed the
district court’s finding that the forfeiture statute violated Reckmeyer’s right
to his counsel of choice, guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.50 However,
the Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, later reversed the panel decision, finding
that the lack of an attorney’s fee exception did not violate the Sixth
Amendment.51 Specifically, the court found that “there is no established
Sixth Amendment right to pay an attorney with the illicit proceeds of drug
transactions.”52
The Supreme Court, upholding the Fourth Circuit’s disposition of
Caplin & Drysdale, held that neither the Sixth Amendment nor the Fifth

42

Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619.
Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. V)).
44
See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a) (2006 & Supp. 2009).
45
Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 619–20.
46
Id. at 620.
47
Id. at 620–21.
48
Id. at 621.
49
Id. at 623–24.
50
United States v. Harvey, 814 F.2d 905, 909 (4th Cir. 1987), rev’d en banc, 837 F.2d
637 (4th Cir. 1988).
51
In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837 F.2d 637, 640 (4th
Cir. 1988) (en banc).
52
Id.
43
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Amendment prohibited the forfeiture scheme in question.53 In his majority
opinion, Justice Byron White was concerned that an attorney’s fee
exception would permit, for example, a robbery suspect to use stolen funds
to retain an expensive attorney.54 The majority opinion was built around
this “bank robber” hypothetical, making several arguments in support.
First, Justice White suggested that the bank robber in possession of some
nonforfeitable assets is free to pay an attorney with those assets.55 If a
defendant lacks the resources to hire an attorney, he is free to rely on
appointed counsel, but in any case, “[a] defendant may not insist on
representation by an attorney he cannot afford.”56
Second, the majority opinion indicated that the federal government has
a substantial interest in the property rights conveyed by the forfeiture
statute.57 The Court enumerated three particular government interests in the
forfeited assets: (1) depositing them into the Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund,
(2) permitting crime victims to make claims to forfeited assets under the
statute, and (3) deflating the resources of organized crime.58 In the Court’s
opinion, these resources “include[] the use of such economic power to
retain private counsel.”59
Consequently, the Court found that the
government’s interest in the forfeitable funds overrode the defendant’s
Sixth Amendment interests.60
Third, the majority opinion summarily dismissed concerns that the
lack of an attorney’s fee exception may give rise to prosecutorial abuse, as
“[e]very criminal law carries with it the potential for abuse.”61 Finally,
Justice White expressed a concern that a constitutionally mandated
exception for attorney’s fees would give rise to additional exceptions to
fund other constitutional rights.62 Underscoring the majority’s hostility to
the application of a qualified right to counsel of choice, Justice White
echoed the appellate court’s conclusion that “[t]he modern day Jean Valjean
53

Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 617.
Id. at 626.
55
Id. at 625.
56
Id. at 624 (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988)).
57
Id. at 627 (“In § 853(c), the so-called relation-back provision, Congress dictated that
[a]ll right, title and interest in property obtained by criminals via the illicit means described
in the statute vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to
forfeiture.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
58
Id. at 629–30.
59
Id. at 630.
60
Id. at 631.
61
Id. at 634 (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837
F.2d 637, 648 (4th Cir. 1988)).
62
Id. at 628 (“If defendants have a right to spend forfeitable assets on attorney’s fees,
why not on exercises of the right to speak, practice one’s religion, or travel?”).
54
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must be satisfied with appointed counsel. Yet the drug merchant claims
that his possession of huge sums of money . . . entitles him to something
more. We reject this contention. . . .”63
In Caplin & Drysdale’s companion case, United States v. Monsanto
(Monsanto III), the Supreme Court heard an appeal from the Second
Circuit. Sitting en banc, the Second Circuit had ruled that a restraining
order freezing the defendant’s assets be modified to allow the defendant to
pay “legitimate (that is, non-sham) attorney’s fees.”64 The court further
ruled that fees paid to the defendant’s attorney would not be forfeitable in
the event of conviction.65
However, in Monsanto III, the Supreme Court reversed the Second
Circuit’s decision.66 The Monsanto III defendant argued that the forfeiture
statute, as applied, violated his qualified right to counsel of choice
established in the Sixth Amendment as well as his Fifth Amendment right
to a “balance of forces” between the defense and the prosecution.67 The
majority opinion, also written by Justice White, applied the holding in
Caplin & Drysdale and ruled that the freezing of assets needed to buy a
legal defense offended neither of those rights.68 The companion decisions
Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale therefore firmly established that
criminal forfeiture laws permit restraining funds that a defendant wishes to
use for legal representation.
II. POST-1989 FEDERAL APPELLATE DEVELOPMENTS
After its disposition in the Supreme Court in 1989 as Monsanto III, the
Supreme Court remanded the case, and it was ultimately reheard by the
Second Circuit.69 In deciding Monsanto III, the Supreme Court left the
lower courts to determine a procedural matter: whether a pretrial restraining
order freezing a defendant’s assets should require some sort of hearing.70
When the case returned to the Second Circuit as Monsanto IV, the court
ruled that a pretrial adversarial ruling was necessary to freeze the

63
Id. at 630 (quoting In re Forfeiture Hearing as to Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered, 837
F.2d at 649).
64
United States v. Monsanto (Monsanto II), 852 F.2d 1400, 1402 (2d Cir. 1988) (per
curiam), rev’d, 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
65
Id.
66
Monsanto III, 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989).
67
Id. at 614.
68
Id.
69
Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d 1186, 1191 (2d Cir. 1991).
70
Monsanto III, 491 U.S. at 615 & n.10 (“We do not consider today, however, whether the
Due Process Clause requires a hearing before a pretrial restraining order can be imposed.”).
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defendant’s assets.71 The D.C. Circuit in United States v. E-Gold, Ltd.
conformed to Monsanto IV and held that due process requires a pretrial
adversarial hearing on the probable cause of the underlying indictment
where asset access is necessary to hire an attorney.72
In United States v. Kaley, however, the Eleventh Circuit created a
circuit split by ruling that defendants subject to forfeiture may not challenge
the evidentiary support for the charges against them before trial.73 Instead,
a defendant in a pretrial forfeiture hearing in the Eleventh Circuit would
only be permitted to challenge the “traceability” of the frozen assets to the
forfeiture offense and not the viability of the underlying claim. 74 This Part
discusses these developments in more detail.
A. MONSANTO IV

On remand, the Second Circuit concluded that due process
necessitated a hearing before a pretrial restraining order could be put in
place, and the court indicated the form of the hearing:
We conclude that (1) the fifth and sixth amendments, considered in combination,
require an adversary, post-restraint, pretrial hearing as to probable cause that (a) the
defendant committed crimes that provide a basis for forfeiture, and (b) the properties
specified as forfeitable in the indictment are properly forfeitable, to continue a
restraint of assets (i) needed to retain counsel of choice and (ii) ordered ex parte
pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1)(A)(1988); (2) consistent with 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(3)
(1988), the court may receive and consider at such a hearing evidence and information
that would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence; and (3) grand jury
determinations of probable cause may be reconsidered in such a hearing. 75

In deciding that a hearing was necessary, the Second Circuit found
particularly important that a defendant denied an opportunity to contest the
restraint of assets is effectively deprived of hired counsel.76
The Government agreed that due process requires a pretrial hearing
during oral argument; however, the Government disagreed with the Second
Circuit’s determination of what the hearing must include.77 Specifically,
the Government wished to allow the defendant to question the grand jury’s
determination of which assets were forfeitable without questioning the
determination of probable cause that the defendant committed an offense.78
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78

Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1191.
United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1330 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 1317.
Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1203.
Id. at 1195.
Id. at 1196.
Id.
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However, the Second Circuit concluded that, while the legislative history
was skeptical of pre-restraint hearings,79 it had little to say regarding the
possibility of holding a post-restraint hearing to continue the restraining
order until trial.80
Giving further form to this adversarial, post-restraint, pretrial hearing,
the court sought to limit the burden it placed on prosecutors.81 Specifically,
the court indicated that the Federal Rules of Evidence would not be
followed in these hearings thus permitting hearsay testimony.82 This
modification catered to the Government’s concern that a pretrial procedure
would impose an undue burden on prosecutors.83 The court further pointed
out that prosecutors are always free to forego restraining assets pretrial to
protect their cases; post-trial forfeiture is still a viable option.84
B. UNITED STATES V. E-GOLD, LTD.

In another asset forfeiture case, the D.C. Circuit issued a ruling similar
to the Second Circuit in Monsanto IV.85 The E-Gold court agreed with
Monsanto IV’s conclusion that, because criminal defendants subject to asset
forfeiture may attempt to hide their assets, a pre-restraint hearing is simply
not possible.86 In determining the necessity of a post-restraint, pretrial
hearing, the court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge test, which is used to
determine whether an individual’s due process rights have been violated.87
The Mathews test involves a three-step analysis to determine: (1) the
private interests that are affected, (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of
those interests and whether adequate safeguards can be imposed, and (3) the
government’s interests.88 Weighing these factors, the court first determined
the private interest affected by whether a pretrial hearing occurs.89 In this
regard, the court found that private interests weighed particularly heavily,
affecting not only a defendant’s ability to dispose of his property as he

79

Id. at 1199; S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 196 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3379.
Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1199.
81
Id. at 1198.
82
Id.
83
S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 196 (“[T]hese requirements may make pursuing a restraining
order inadvisable from the prosecutor’s point of view because of the potential for damaging
premature disclosure of the government’s case and trial strategy and for jeopardizing the
safety of witnesses . . . .”).
84
Monsanto IV, 924 F.2d at 1208.
85
United States v. E-Gold, Ltd., 521 F.3d 411, 416–19 (D.C. Cir. 2008).
86
Id. at 416–17.
87
Id. at 417; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
88
Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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E-Gold, 521 F.3d at 417.
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pleases but also a defendant’s qualified Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.90 This finding led the court to conclude that the first Mathews
factor pointed decisively toward holding a hearing.91
In weighing the second factor, the court determined that forfeiture
involved a high risk of erroneous deprivation.92 The court pointed out that a
judge issued the original seizure warrant following an ex parte proceeding,93
and the court further explained that an adversarial hearing could bring to
light new evidence that makes restraint unnecessary or unwarranted. An ex
parte proceeding is unlikely to produce opposing viewpoints.94
Additionally, a hearing would fulfill a “fundamental requirement of due
process[,] . . . the opportunity to be heard.”95
Finally, the court weighed the government’s interests to complete the
Mathews analysis.96 In weighing the government’s interests, the court did
not find sufficient reason to set aside the defendant’s due process rights.97
Similar to the Monsanto IV court, the E-Gold court found that the “invasion
of grand jury secrecy” could be avoided by holding in camera hearings and
relaxing the applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence.98
C. UNITED STATES V. KALEY

In United States v. Kaley, the defendants were dissimilar from the
defendants in Monsanto or Caplin & Drysdale; unlike the forfeiture
defendants of the 1980s, the Kaleys were not accused of trafficking illegal
narcotics. Instead, the defendants were a married couple accused of
stealing prescription medical devices99 from hospitals and selling them
across state lines.100 The Kaleys were handed a seven-count indictment,
alleging, inter alia, that they had engaged in a conspiracy to transport
prescription medical devices that they knew to be stolen.101 The indictment
also listed forfeitable assets to be frozen, including a certificate of deposit

90

Id.
Id. at 418.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id. (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)).
96
Id. at 418–19.
97
Id. at 419.
98
Id.
99
Prescription medical devices (PMDs) are FDA-regulated objects that run the gamut
from artificial hearts to sutures to tongue depressors. Does FDA Regulate Medical Devices?,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://goo.gl/yLlFrm (last visited Dec. 19, 2013).
100
United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012).
101
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2012).
91
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that the Kaleys had purchased with the proceeds of a home equity line of
credit.102
In the district court, the Kaleys moved to vacate the asset-freezing
restraining order that was issued as a result of the indictment.103 The
magistrate judge found probable cause that the Kaleys’ residence and the
certificate of deposit were “involved in” the violations of law and therefore
ordered that those assets be restrained.104 On appeal, the D.C. Circuit
reversed the district court’s denial of a pretrial evidentiary hearing and
remanded the case to the district court.105
In the pretrial hearing, the Kaleys challenged the Government’s theory
of the case, arguing that the facts could not support the charges.106 In
denying the motion to vacate the asset freeze, the district court reportedly
held that “the only relevant inquiry at the hearing was whether the
restrained assets were traceable to or involved in the alleged criminal
conduct.”107
In its ruling, the Eleventh Circuit acted, at least partially, out of
concern that allowing a full evidentiary hearing on the merits of the case
would impermissibly set aside the grand jury’s probable cause
determination.108 The court emphasized the grand jury’s independence and
the fact that it is not a part of the prosecutorial arm.109 Along these lines,
the court pointed out that defendants get a modicum of due process, because
the prosecution must obtain a court order to freeze assets after the grand
jury’s indictment.110
The Kaley decision reflects an overarching judicial desire to avoid
giving criminal defendants another route to delay their trials: “[A]
defendant whose assets have been restrained will ultimately receive a
thorough hearing—the trial itself—that goes to the merits of the underlying
charge. . . . The question is simply whether the Due Process Clause requires
that the defendant get two such hearings.”111 As further justification, the
court expressed its enthusiasm for criminal forfeiture’s objective of
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Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1318.
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104
Id. at 1318–19.
105
Id. at 1319.
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Id.
107
Id. at 1320.
108
Id. at 1323 (“[T]he Court has shown a profound reluctance to allow pretrial
challenges to a grand jury’s probable cause determination.”).
109
Id. at 1325.
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Id. at 1327.
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Id.
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removing the incentives for crime.112 Although this is a worthy objective,
this Comment argues that the consequences of forfeiture’s current
implementation outweigh the need to disincentivize crime. The Monsanto
IV and E-Gold decisions were correct in moving toward more protections
for defendants, while Kaley was unforgiving in its strict applications of
Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale, doing serious damage to the Sixth
Amendment.
III. FLAWS UNDERPINNING MONSANTO III AND CAPLIN & DRYSDALE
Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale were decided before the
explosion of forfeiture proceedings.113 This fact alone means that the courts
deciding subsequent cases should account for the change in environment.
But aside from the increased amount of forfeitures, the Supreme Court
failed to anticipate the effects these decisions would have on the defense
bar. Further, the Court decided Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale under
the influence of an analogy that reverberates through the subsequent case
law114: the question-begging proposition that forfeiture defendants are the
same as bank robbers caught red-handed and can be presumed guilty for the
purposes of forfeiture proceedings.
A. THE “EXPLOSION” OF FORFEITURE

In Caplin & Drysdale, the Supreme Court dismissed out of hand the
defendant’s concerns about abusive forfeiture practices.115 In light of recent
evidence regarding the use of forfeiture statutes (both civil and criminal),
this flippant attitude should be reconsidered. In the 1980s, after the passage
of the CFA, federal use of the forfeiture power “exploded.”116 Prior to the
CFA, authorities deposited forfeiture proceeds into general government
funds.117 However, the CFA amended the Comprehensive Drug Abuse and
112

Id. at 1329.
See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 33, at 32 tbl.7. Much of the growth of forfeiture has
occurred since 2000 with the Asset Forfeiture Fund doubling in size between 2000 and 2008
from $536,500,000 to $1,000,700,000. Id.
114
See Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989) (“A
robbery suspect, for example, has no Sixth Amendment right to use funds he has stolen from a
bank to retain an attorney to defend him if he is apprehended.”); Monsanto III, 491 U.S. 600,
614 (1989) (“We rely on our conclusion in [Caplin & Drysdale] to dispose of the similar
constitutional claims raised by respondent here.”); United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316,
1320–21 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012) (citing Justice White’s bank robber analogy).
115
Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 634 (“Petitioner’s claim—that the power available to
prosecutors under the statute could be abused—proves too much, for many tools available to
prosecutors can be misused in a way that violates the rights of innocent persons.”).
116
WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 33, at 10.
117
Id.
113
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Prevention Act to establish an Assets Forfeiture Fund, which would receive
all forfeited funds.118
The Fund was subsequently opened up to allow law enforcement
personnel to use the funds to outfit themselves with cars, laboratory
equipment, communication equipment, and even aircraft.119
More
disturbingly, funds also became available to pay law enforcement officers’
overtime salaries.120 Law enforcement officers thus have individual
pecuniary interests in which crimes they choose to pursue. To further
incentivize forfeitures, the Justice Department began cooperating with local
law enforcement, offering a cut of the seizures to participating local
agencies.121 This “equitable sharing” arrangement often operates to
circumvent state laws prohibiting forfeiture funds from being used by state
police.122
If one thing is clear, it is what results from these policies. Forfeitures
have increased from $93.7 million in 1986 to a total of net assets in the
Fund of over $1 billion by 2008.123 Law enforcement’s desire to control
these funds has created a perverse incentive for prosecutors to arrest for
forfeiture offenses, and in particular, drug-related crimes.124 In fact, some
commentators have indicated that the push for the War on Drugs beginning
in the 1970s is a direct result of the changes made to forfeiture laws.125
Because forfeiture laws vary by state, it is simple to determine whether
states with tough forfeiture laws also feature more drug arrests and
prosecutions.126 A study on this precise question concluded that law
enforcement officers are far more likely to make drug arrests in
jurisdictions where police can retain the assets they seize.127 These results
support the economic theory of bureaucracy, namely that “bureaucrats[’]
desire increases in discretionary budgets, and that they also have a good
deal of discretion in deciding how to allocate resources in the short run. In
118

Id. at 10–11.
28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1)(F)(i)–(iii) (2012).
120
Id. at § 524(c)(1)(I).
121
Brent D. Mast et al., Entrepreneurial Police and Drug Enforcement Policy, 104 PUB.
CHOICE 285, 287 (2000).
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Id.
123
WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 33, at 11.
124
Id.
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See Mast et al., supra note 121, at 287. See generally Emily Dufton, The War on
Drugs: How President Nixon Tied Addiction to Crime, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 26, 2012, 12:04
PM), http://goo.gl/C2DJjY (detailing the inception of the War on Drugs during the Nixon
Administration).
126
See Mast, supra note 121, at 301–02.
127
Id. at 301–03 (“Legislation permitting police to keep a portion of seized assets raises drug
arrests as a portion of total arrests by about 20 percent and drug arrest rates by about 18 percent.”).
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other words, like market entrepreneurs, entrepreneurial bureaucrats will
respond to relative prices.”128 In the case of forfeitures, the data support the
theory that police officers and prosecutors have disproportionately pursued
drug offenders to increase forfeiture funds.
More concerning, further research indicates that this approach distorts
drug policy, unduly incentivizing drug interdiction over drug treatment.129
Finally, a recent survey of law enforcement executives found that nearly
40% of the police agencies now see forfeiture proceeds as necessary to
police operations.130 The Justice Department, historically, has even asked
its attorneys to step up forfeiture proceedings in order to meet budgetary
targets.131 In Caplin & Drysdale, the Supreme Court saw no cause for
concern about the abuse of asset forfeiture proceedings.132 One can only
hope that more contemporary analyses of the issue will give rise to greater
concern. The unique issue in asset forfeiture cases of the personal interests
of law enforcement officers and prosecutors should give the Court reason to
institute better safeguards for defendants.
B. SOCIALIZATION OF THE DEFENSE BAR

Another potential consequence of the rise of criminal forfeiture
proceedings is the socialization of the criminal defense bar—criminal
defense attorneys will be increasingly appointed, not hired. As discussed
above, asset freezing can often prevent criminal defendants from hiring
attorneys of their choice.133 As more and more offenses become forfeitable,
public defenders increasingly become the only options for criminal
defendants. However, this is not the only effect that Monsanto III and
Caplin & Drysdale have on the criminal defense bar.
In his dissent from Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale, Justice Harry
Blackmun wrote, “Had it been Congress’ express aim to undermine the
adversary system as we know it, it could hardly have found a better engine
of destruction than attorney’s-fee forfeiture.”134 Justice Blackmun was
extremely concerned that attorneys would refuse to take on the defense of
potential defendants who may be accused of forfeitable crimes.135
Attorneys would be quite hesitant to take on a client whose fees could be
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130
131
132
133
134
135

Id. at 303.
Id.
WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 33, at 12.
Id.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 634 (1989).
Id. at 648 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
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seized after the fact via the “relation-back” component136 of the forfeiture
statute.137 Beyond the immediate issue of whether an attorney could be
retained, criminal attorneys would also now be wary of whether their
unindicted clients’ fees could be forfeitable in the future.
Further, in Justice Blackmun’s view, private attorneys, “so foolish,
ignorant, beholden or idealistic as to take the business,” would have serious
problems representing their clients.138 To establish themselves as bona-fide
purchasers under the CFA, they would have to remain intentionally ignorant
of their clients’ potentially or allegedly illegal conduct so as to maintain
that they were “reasonably without cause to believe that the property was
subject to forfeiture. . . .”139 Nor would a contingency fee arrangement
solve these concerns. After all, such arrangements are a violation of ethical
norms and are prohibited.140
Aside from the direct effects on criminal defense attorneys and their
potential clients, the socialization of the criminal defense bar has
deleterious effects on the development of the law. In the prosecution of

136

21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (2006 & Supp. 2009) states in relevant part:

All right, title, and interest in any property described in subsection (a) of this section vests in the
United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this section. Any
such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than the defendant may be the
subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall be ordered forfeited to the United
States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this section that
he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property who at the time of the purchase was
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to forfeiture under this section.
137

Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 648–49 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. at 649 (quoting United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)).
139
Id. at 655.
140
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d) (2012) (“A lawyer shall not enter into an
arrangement for, charge, or collect: . . . (2) a contingent fee for representing a defendant in a
criminal case.”); see also Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 649 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
138

Perhaps the attorney will be willing to violate ethical norms by working on a contingent-fee basis
in a criminal case. But if he is not—and we should question the integrity of any criminal-defense
attorney who would violate the ethical norms of the profession by doing so—the attorney’s own
interests will dictate that he remain ignorant of the source of the assets from which he is paid.

Id. (internal citation omitted).
Given the ethical rules against contingency fee criminal defenses, any non-pro bono
defense of a forfeiture defendant could be considered a contingency fee defense. Even if
funds are not yet frozen, it is unclear whether the specter of the “relation-back” provision as
applied to attorneys converts a noncontingency fee legal defense into a contingency fee legal
defense. This topic has been neglected as of late, and a reevaluation of the ethical rule
against these arrangements may be merited. See generally Lindsey N. Godfrey, Note,
Rethinking the Ethical Ban on Criminal Contingent Fees: A Commonsense Approach to
Asset Forfeiture, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1699 (2001) (arguing that, with proper safeguards,
contingency fee criminal defense can be ethically defensible). However, this interesting
discussion is beyond the scope of this Comment.
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Megaupload, for example, the defendant’s case involved novel issues of
copyright law, specifically whether there secondary criminal liability can be
imposed for copyright infringement. These legal issues will not likely be
adequately explored by public defenders with little experience with
copyright law or the time to fully research the issues. Court-appointed
attorneys often lack the time and resources to take on complex litigation.141
It seems counterproductive for a case involving $50 million and the
development of the broader copyright law to be decided by an attorney with
little experience in the area. Even in the RICO and CCE cases to which the
CFA was originally aimed, “[d]espite the legal profession’s commitment to
pro bono work, it is doubtful that attorneys would be willing to invest the
many hours of legal work necessary to defend against these serious
charges . . . .”142
C. BANK ROBBERS, THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH, AND THE QUALIFIED
RIGHT TO COUNSEL OF CHOICE

The Supreme Court has established that, under the Sixth Amendment,
criminal defendants enjoy the right to counsel of their choosing.143
However, this right has been qualified in a few key ways.144 For example,
the Court has ruled that a client cannot choose an attorney who is not a
member of the bar.145 Additionally, the Court has ruled that a defendant is
not entitled to counsel that the defendant cannot afford.146
Pursuant to these limitations, the majority opinion in Caplin &
Drysdale likened the forfeiture defendant to a bank robber.147 Justice White
pointed out that a bank robbery suspect, caught with funds stolen from a
bank, would not be permitted to use those funds to hire an attorney.148 The
notion that the forfeiture defendant is analogous to a robber caught redhanded with stolen money underpins the Court’s lack of sympathy for
forfeiture defendants.149 Like the bank robber, the forfeiture defendant has
no legal claim over the suspect assets because of the “relation-back”

141
United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1476 (5th Cir. 1986); Bright & Sanneh, supra
note 20, at 5.
142
United States v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 1308, 1316 (D. Md. 1986).
143
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (“It is hardly necessary to say that, the
right to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair opportunity to secure
counsel of his own choice.”).
144
Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988).
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 625 (1989).
148
Id.
149
See United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1320 n.2 (11th Cir. 2012).

2014]

IMPOSING INDIGENCE

183

provision of the forfeiture statute.150 Justice White further justified this
analogy by using the rationale of forfeiture laws to deprive organized crime
of its economic power.151 Justice White’s reasoning is also important to the
Kaley decision.
Yet, this analogy is flawed for five reasons. First, as in Kaley, it is not
entirely clear which funds are forfeitable and which funds are not.152
Justice White’s analogy invokes a particular image in the reader’s mind: a
bank robber on the run, perhaps on the way back from the heist. His illgotten gains are bank-bags full of cash and gold bullion and are therefore
conveniently marked for law enforcement confiscation. The reader knows
immediately that these bags do not belong to the robber, and that they must
be returned to the bank. In contrast, the defendants in Kaley allegedly used
tainted funds to purchase a home and ultimately obtain a line of credit on
the home.153 The alleged ill-gotten gains became intermingled with the rest
of the family’s funds, making it no longer easy to discern the allegedly
illegitimate and forfeitable funds from the family’s legitimate lifetime
savings.
Second, Justice White’s analogy is question-begging. In establishing
the hypothetical, he states: “A robbery suspect, for example, has no Sixth
Amendment right to use funds he has stolen from a bank to retain an
attorney. . . .”154 Of course, it is not uncontroversial that stolen money
should be used for the robber’s legal defense. However, Justice White’s
example has already declared the defendant guilty by assuming that he has
stolen property in his possession. This assumption goes against the
fundamental doctrine of American criminal law that every defendant “is
presumed to be innocent until his guilt is proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”155
Third, unlike Justice White’s bank robber, many forfeiture defendants
have commingled their allegedly ill-gotten gains with their other property.
What makes modern criminal asset forfeiture so troubling is that defendants
rarely have easily marked property that clearly does not belong to them.
Defendants subject to forfeiture are generally not accused of theft, so it is
unclear what property of theirs constitutes ill-gotten gains. As was the case
in Kaley, funds are often commingled with each other and used for large
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Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 625 (1989).
Id. at 618.
See United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2012).
Id.
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 626 (1989).
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895).
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purchases, such as cars or homes.156 This commingling makes all of the
defendant’s property forfeitable, regardless of whether substantial portions
of the property were purchased with untainted funds. In contrast, Justice
White’s bank robber may spend his savings or liquidate assets, which
remain untainted.
This third argument, in particular, speaks to the need for an
adversarial, post-restraint, pretrial hearing where a defendant can contest
her charges. A hearing imposes little additional burden on prosecutors. It
should not be difficult to show probable cause that a defendant in
possession of large amounts of cash in bank bags has robbed a bank—a
bank robber will not likely escape the reach of a forfeiture statute because
of this pretrial hearing.
Fourth, Justice White’s analogy does not account for the fact that,
generally, forfeitable assets are not returned to crime victims, let alone the
victims of the particular crime allegedly committed by the defendant.157
Justice White’s bank robber analogy assumes that the money taken from the
robber goes right back into the bank vault—not to the Justice Department.
In 2008, the Justice Department Fund had over $1 billion in debt-free assets
available for law enforcement,158 making it clear that the vast amount of
forfeiture funds are not returned to victims. In fiscal year 2012,
approximately 17% of the total funds the Justice Department seized through
civil and criminal forfeiture were spent on victim compensation.159 At oral
argument, the Government did not dispute Justice Stephen Breyer’s claim
that even less goes to victims: roughly 5% to 10%.160
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See Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1318.
Melinda Hardy, Comment, Sixth Amendment—Applicability of Right to Counsel of
Choice to Forfeiture of Attorneys’ Fees, 80 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1154, 1176 (1990)
(“[I]n the case of forfeiture, however, no innocent victim will be denied his/her savings if a
defendant uses tainted assets to pay the attorney.”).
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See WILLIAMS ET AL., supra note 33, at 6.
159
See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL STATISTICAL
REPORT 89 tbl.16 (2012), available at http://goo.gl/MfAcUS. Approximately $426 million
was seized in criminal forfeiture proceedings and almost $9 billion was seized in civil
forfeiture proceedings. By contrast, a total of approximately $1.5 billion was spent on
victim compensation.
160 Transcript of Oral Argument at 43–44, Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464 (argued
Oct. 16, 2013).
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JUSTICE BREYER: [A] rough guess would be 5 or 10 percent goes to victims. Now do you
have a better estimate?
MR. DREEBEN: I don’t, Justice Breyer. I do know that one of the main purposes in seeking
funds for forfeiture, particularly in white collar cases like this, is to pay restitution.
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Fifth and finally, Justice White’s analogy fails to take into account the
specter that forfeiture laws put over criminal defendants. Even before they
become defendants, any attorneys they retain must be wary that their fees
may become forfeitable in the future.161 This possibility works to prevent
potential defendants from retaining counsel even before they are restrained
from disposing of their assets, “strip[ping] the defendant of the right to
retain counsel.”162
Justice White analogizes the generic forfeiture defendant who wants to
use forfeitable funds to pay for an attorney to a bank robber wishing to do
the same. For the above reasons, this analogy is inadequate. It paints a
picture of a defendant who has clearly committed a crime, carries in his
possession the clear proceeds of that crime, and is apprehended by a law
enforcement officer who will return those proceeds to their rightful owner.
In many cases, none of this is true.
The bank robber analogy is particularly damaging in the context of the
pretrial, post-restraint hearing. If this analogy were an apt description of the
facts, the Kaley approach (which cited this example) begins to make sense.
There is no need for a pretrial, post-restraint hearing if the court already
knows that the defendant is guilty and is in possession of forfeitable funds.
However, the flaws in Justice White’s bank robber analogy illustrate the
importance of a pretrial proceeding.
IV. NEW ARGUMENTS IN KALEY
In Kaley, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the arguments made in the
Supreme Court’s rulings in Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale. However,
the Eleventh Circuit also introduced new arguments in favor of lessprotective pretrial forfeiture procedures. Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit
made the argument that a pretrial hearing on the merits of the underlying
grand jury determination impermissibly intrudes on the grand jury’s
province.163 In addition, the Eleventh Circuit was cautious that the hearing
might become a “second trial.164 Neither of these considerations adequately

161
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 654 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting).
162
Id.
163
United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1323 (11th Cir. 2012) (“[T]his kind of pretrial
challenge to the evidence supporting an indictment would be wholly inconsistent with the
Supreme Court’s repeated pronouncements in Costello v. United States and its progeny. In
these cases, the Court has shown a profound reluctance to allow pretrial challenges to a
grand jury’s probable cause determination.” (internal citation omitted)).
164
Id. at 1327 (“[A] defendant whose assets have been restrained will ultimately receive
a thorough hearing—the trial itself. . . . The question is simply whether the Due Process
Clause requires that the defendant get two such hearings.”).
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addresses the plight of the forfeiture defendant whose assets have been
frozen and who can no longer afford an attorney.
A. THE SANCTITY OF THE GRAND JURY

In deciding Kaley, the Eleventh Circuit was concerned that a pretrial
hearing would contradict the grand jury’s indictment, running afoul of the
Supreme Court’s “profound reluctance to allow pretrial challenges to a
grand jury’s probable cause determination.”165 This is a key sticking point
on the road to a full, adversarial, pretrial, and post-restraint hearing. Such a
hearing would require the prosecution to show with probable cause that an
offense occurred and would therefore have the potential to reconsider the
facts and law underlying the grand jury indictment.166
Indeed, in Costello v. United States, the Supreme Court concluded that
a defendant has no right to, in effect, try his case prior to the trial: “An
indictment returned by a legally constituted and unbiased grand jury, . . . if
valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the charge on the merits. The
Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.”167 The Eleventh Circuit
thoroughly explained the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding the
grand jury and the strictness with which the grand jury’s determinations are
usually protected.168 At the end of its analysis, the court concluded, “a
defendant cannot challenge whether there is a sufficient evidentiary
foundation to support the grand jury’s probable cause determination.”169
This result is problematic for a number of reasons.
First, such a stance is not mandated by the Supreme Court’s grand jury
jurisprudence. None of the decisions referenced in the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision relate to the application of a forfeiture statute.170 This context is
important because of the novelty of criminal forfeiture actions. In initiating
forfeiture, prosecutors are seeking something “extra”171 beyond the
traditional tools of imprisonment or fine—freezing assets before a
determination of guilt or innocence. Because freezing funds implicates the
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Kaley, 677 F.3d at 1323–25.
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defendant’s ability to mount a legal defense, it is of an entirely different
character than pretrial detention. When RICO was passed in 1970, it was
the first criminal forfeiture law in the United States172—it would be odd for
the device to fit neatly into existing criminal procedure law. At oral
argument in Kaley, even Chief Justice John Roberts was unsure that the
“grand jury” argument was even relevant to this case.173 Because the
procedure itself is new, it justifies new procedural protections.
Second, it is important to note that pretrial restraining orders are
discretionary—the statute does not require law enforcement officers to
utilize forfeiture statutes.174 Because prosecutors maintain discretion to
seek forfeiture, they are not “forced” to undergo pretrial hearings.
Prosecutors can instead choose not to pursue forfeiture as a strategy. 175
Nor will the imposition of a full pretrial hearing dramatically burden
prosecutors. The “worst that will happen is that the pretrial restraint on
property will not continue.”176 Therefore, the stakes for prosecutors are
relatively low because of the opportunities for full criminal trials, regardless
of the outcome of the pretrial hearings.177
Next, the legal and financial burden to hold pretrial hearings would not
be severe. After all, the government would only be required to “establish
probable cause a second time and in the presence of the defendant.”178 This
would not be a high hurdle—the only difference in the procedure is that it
would be adversarial, giving the defendant a chance to present her story.
Any concern that such hearings will make a prosecutor’s job more difficult
is somewhat circular. If the charges cannot be proven with a substantially
lowered burden of proof, perhaps trials are warranted before defendants are
impoverished. Moreover, applying the forfeiture device seems to be
lucrative enough for law enforcement that the government will not
discontinue its use, even if its costs increase. After all, the activity
produces revenue.179 As argued above, because the use of forfeiture is an
incredibly helpful and new tool for law enforcement, it justifies new
protections.
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Nor should the safety of witnesses and victims be overriding concerns
in formulating the hearings. The legislative history of the CFA indicated a
concern that pretrial hearings would unnecessarily endanger witnesses
testifying against criminals.180 The Kaley court found this legislative
history persuasive.181 However, this reasoning ignores two possible
solutions to the secrecy problem. First, in camera hearings can be
employed to protect witnesses.182 These proceedings would take place
either in the judge’s chambers or in a secured, empty courtroom.183 This
could prevent the public from gaining knowledge as to witnesses’ identities.
Second and more importantly, the Federal Rules of Evidence would
not apply in these pretrial hearings.184 Sidestepping the Rules of Evidence
would allow the court to keep witnesses anonymous by allowing hearsay
testimony.185 This is precisely the procedure the Monsanto court used on
remand.186 These standards would be able to adequately protect the
government’s interests in these hearings, even if they reconsider the
probable cause determination made by the grand jury. At oral argument in
E-Gold, the Government could not articulate any harmful consequences
from using this standard in the Second Circuit,187 illustrating that the only
Government objection to the added procedure is that prosecutors would
“prefer not to.”188 In oral argument at the Supreme Court in Kaley, the
Government was evasive in articulating the impact of the Monsanto/E-Gold
rule upon prosecutors in applicable circuits.189
180

S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 196 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3379.
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Transcript of Oral Argument at 39–41, Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464 (argued
Oct. 16, 2013).
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JUSTICE BREYER: In how many cases in those circuits has the government faced the serious
risks that you’re talking about?
MR. DREEBEN: We do face them. I cannot quantify them -JUSTICE BREYER: Can you give me a guess? You are -- I mean, you make a huge point of
how this will put the government at a disadvantage, so someone in your office, probably you,
asked people in the Justice Department, do you have any examples? Or how many cases have
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Finally, it is important to note that the Kaley court may have oversold
the “unique nature of the grand jury as an independent body, not an arm of
the prosecution.”190 The court put much emphasis on the idea that the grand
jury “serves the invaluable function in our society of standing between the
accuser and the accused.”191 The Kaley court used this proposition to
conclude that defendants are protected because the prosecution cannot
restrain assets without a grand jury’s probable cause determination.192
However, the court never examined the original proposition that grand
juries shield the populace from overzealous prosecution. Indeed, the idea
that the grand jury is a “protective bulwark” is a long held, but ultimately
unjustified, legal fiction.193 This proposition is protected by the rules of
secrecy that prevent the public from knowing its workings.194 Since the
early twentieth century, critics have referred to a grand jury as a “rubber
stamp,” a “fifth wheel,” and a “total captive of the prosecutor.”195 This
there been where serious problems arose? And you probably got some kind of answer. So you
probably have some kind of idea.
MR. DREEBEN: You’re correct, I did ask, and I received anecdotal responses.
JUSTICE BREYER: How many anecdotes?
(Laughter.)
MR. DREEBEN: I received several specific anecdotes of instances in which the government
elected not to proceed with a hearing.
JUSTICE BREYER: In a number of cases, several specific. Is that more like four or is it more
like 24?
MR. DREEBEN: There are group numbers in which offices reported, we have encountered this a
number of times.

Id. The Government’s vagueness on this point should not be construed in its favor.
190
United States v. Kaley, 677 F.3d 1316, 1325 (11th Cir. 2012). The court also noted:
It’s worth emphasizing that the prosecution cannot unilaterally restrain a defendant’s assets
between the time of indictment and trial. In the first place, a prosecutor may seek a pretrial
restraint only because Congress has specifically authorized the government to proceed in this
manner. . . . And the restraining order will issue only if a lawfully constituted grand jury has
found probable cause . . . .
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skepticism has become so widespread that the claim that a grand jury would
“indict a ham sandwich” is now “cliché.”196 At oral argument in Kaley,
even Chief Justice Roberts threw cold water on the Government’s claim
that the grand jury protects Americans from unreasonable prosecution.197
Of course, although we refer to “grand jury investigations” and
“determinations,” the reality is quite different.198 It is, after all, the
prosecutor who is in the driver’s seat.199 It is the prosecutor who chooses
which witnesses to subpoena and controls the process.200 Evidence is often
delivered to the prosecutor, who then displays it for the grand jury.201
Ultimately, a “grand jury hears evidence only to the extent the prosecutor
finds it helpful in building her case for trial.”202 The grand jury does not
even have the power to ask direct questions of the court—its view is
completely dictated by the prosecutor.203
And, of course, the pressures put on prosecutors to seize assets must
play a role in these proceedings. Given that prosecutors are truly in control
of a grand jury investigation, these bureaucratic pressures to increase
forfeiture revenue may begin to skew the process of issuing indictments that
restrain assets.204
B. DOES THE DEFENDANT GET TWO TRIALS?

The Kaley court also seemed wary of the concern that a criminal
defendant might functionally get two trials if the court adopted an

196

Kevin K. Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2335–36
(2008); see also TOM WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES 624 (Picador 2008) (1987)
(quoting former Chief Judge Sol Wachtler from the New York Court of Appeals and
immortalizing the expression).
197
Transcript of Oral Argument at 25–26, Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464 (argued
Oct. 16, 2013).
MR. DREEBEN: The grand jury is set up as an independent body to protect the defendant from
unfounded prosecutions. It is structurally independent from the prosecution and the courts. And
it’s composed of -CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I understand the theory. In reality it’s not terribly -- it’s not great
insulation from the overweaning [sic] power of the government.
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alternative approach.205 Indeed, the court made clear that adopting the
Monsanto and E-Gold approach would “effectively require the district court
to try the case twice.”206 Specifically, the court did not want to allow the
Kaleys a pretrial hearing on the question of whether their actions
constituted a crime.207
However, the Monsanto approach does not truly allow the criminal
defendant two trials. As explained above, an adversarial, pretrial, postrestraint hearing would not be a full trial. There would be no jury,
proceedings would be in camera, and hearsay evidence would be
permissible—this “trial” would lack many of the hallmarks of the American
justice system. In addition, and perhaps more importantly, a forfeiture
proceeding is something “extra” the government seeks.208 With this
relatively novel practice, the government seeks not only to imprison the
defendant and restrain assets post-trial, but it is also demanding that the
defendant be adversely affected before a determination of guilt or
innocence.209 This inverts the American presumption of innocence in
criminal trials. It is therefore only logical that some sort of procedure be
deployed to protect forfeiture defendants.
CONCLUSION
210

In Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale,211 the Supreme Court declined
to strike down elements of the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act, which
prevented defendants with frozen assets from hiring attorneys. Specifically,
these decisions firmly limited the qualified right to counsel guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment212 as well as the Fifth Amendment Due Process right
to a balance of power between the government and the accused.213
However, the Court still left room for lower courts to use some sort of
pretrial, post-restraint hearing. The development of such a process was left
entirely to the lower courts.214
In the intervening years, two chief approaches have developed. The
first approach, established by the Second Circuit in Monsanto IV, allows a
205
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full adversarial hearing on both the question of whether the assets listed in
the grand jury indictment are rightly forfeitable215 and whether there is
probable cause that a crime took place.216 The Second Circuit therefore
created procedures to protect forfeiture defendants without simply ruling
the CFA unconstitutional.217 The D.C. Circuit in E-Gold adopted the
Monsanto approach to pretrial, post-restraint hearings,218 finding little
evidence that the Monsanto approach had unduly hampered prosecutorial
flexibility in the sixteen years since Monsanto.219 In 2012, however, the
Eleventh Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit220 and held in United States v.
Kaley that a pretrial, post-restraint hearing cannot include a questioning of
the grand jury’s probable cause determination that a crime occurred.221
The second approach used in Kaley and Jones before it fails to
recognize the vast impact that forfeiture laws can have on defendants who
have not yet been proven guilty. Because law enforcement officers and
prosecutors have a profit motive to pursue forfeiture crimes, forfeiture
defendants are more likely to be adversely impacted, regardless of whether
they are guilty. Both decisions subscribe to the fundamental, circular logic
that indicted defendants are presumed guilty of the crimes for which they
have been indicted.222
To a certain extent the criticisms of this Comment apply broadly to
Monsanto III and Caplin & Drysdale. In both of these decisions, the Court
held that the Government can prevent a defendant from hiring counsel by
restraining their assets.
Both of these decisions created serious
complications for the criminal defense bar and have restrained criminal
defendants from seeking counsel. Both decisions have created conditions
that “allow[] the government to impose indigence and deprive RICO and
CCE defendants of the opportunity to retain private counsel merely by
obtaining an indictment.”223 Candidly, this author would favor overturning
Caplin & Drysdale. However, at oral argument in Kaley, Justice Antonin
Scalia seemed to be the only Justice on the Court interested in this
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approach.224 Therefore, it would seem that a more conservative solution is
the most realistic.
Additionally, it is necessary to recognize the value of some sort of
forfeiture provision. After all, Justice White’s bank robber should probably
not be permitted to use his ill-gotten gains to hire a legal team. It was
Congress’s intention to “lessen the economic power of organized crime and
drug enterprises,”225 and that is certainly a worthy objective. The Monsanto
IV approach still allows the government to freeze forfeitable funds and
prevent them from being used for attorney’s fees: it does not allow the bank
robber to keep his ill-gotten gains. Monsanto IV creates a meaningful
opportunity for defendants to be heard before their trials—the right to
question the merits of their indictments at trial without their counsel of
choice is simply not helpful. A pretrial, post-restraint hearing helps
neutralize the “substantial risk of an erroneous deprivation of a defendant’s
significant property interest in the absence of an opportunity to be heard.”226
As illustrated in the discussion above, the real trouble with forfeiture
statutes is in discerning the kingpins of ongoing criminal enterprises from
defendants who might actually be innocent. The Monsanto IV approach
provides a middle ground that can help the courts distinguish Michael
Corleones227 from Kerri Kaleys. It also does so without imposing undue
burdens on prosecutors. Forfeiture statues are permissive—prosecutors are
not required to utilize them—so if prosecutors wish not to go through the
process of pretrial hearings, they need only decline the opportunity to freeze
assets. If they choose to utilize the asset forfeiture device, the pretrial
hearings will require only a probable cause standard and will implement
safeguards to prevent others from divulging information that the
prosecutors wish to leave for trial.
224
Transcript of Oral Argument at 14–15, Kaley v. United States, No. 12-464 (argued
Oct. 16, 2013).

JUSTICE SCALIA: To tell you the truth, I would prefer -- to save your client, I would prefer a
rule that says you cannot, even with a grand jury indictment, prevent the defendant from using
funds that are in his possession to hire counsel. Don’t need a hearing. Just, just it’s
unconstitutional for the rule to be any broader than withholding money that the defendant does
not need to defend himself.
Would you like that? I really prefer it to yours. I think yours leads us into really strange
territory.
MR. SREBNICK: Justice Scalia, I believe that was the issue in Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale
where this Court held [in a] 5 to 4 decision that assets that are demonstrably tainted can be
restrained over the objection of the defendant who needs those assets to retain counsel of choice.
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225
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These hearings are not “mini-trials” for the defendants to get second
bites at the apple. If a defendant is successful in the pretrial hearing, she
merely receives control of her assets—the full trial still looms. When the
Supreme Court decides Kaley, it should heed the words of Judge J.L.
Edmondson, concurring in the judgment in Kaley:
The Constitution’s Bill of Rights, including the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, was
intended by the Framers to protect citizens from the high power of the federal
government. The Constitution is to guarantee each citizen a fair deal when the federal
government takes aim at him. More specifically about property, we ought to bear in
mind this fact: “Liberty, property, and no stamps! It had been the first slogan of the
American Revolution.” . . . For the Federal Executive, in effect, to seize a citizen’s
property; to deprive him thereby of the best means to defend himself in a criminal
case; and then, by means of the criminal case, to take his liberty strikes me as a set of
circumstances about which our nation’s history and its Constitution demands that the
process at each step be fully fair.228

Forfeiture has become a formidable and important tool in the
prosecution of criminals. However, the prosecution’s interest in using this
tool must be balanced against the defendant’s interest in due process and
against the greatly increased probability of wrongful prosecution. As such,
the analysis regarding the interests at stake must not rest on the initial
assumption that the defendant is analogous to a bank robber caught redhanded with bags of the bank’s money. The Supreme Court and Eleventh
Circuit’s starting point therefore flies in the face of the fundamental axiom
of American criminal law: criminal defendants are innocent until proven
guilty.
The ongoing Megaupload criminal case displays the flaws in this
logic. Prosecutors chose to bring a criminal case based on a novel theory of
criminal copyright infringement—that secondary infringement gives rise to
criminal liability.229 Without an adversarial pretrial procedure on the merits
of the indictment, Megaupload’s assets will remain frozen, leaving it unable
to adequately defend itself in an extremely complex and expensive case.230
Where criminal forfeiture was originally used against organized criminals
accused of drug offenses and racketeering, it is now used to push novel and
complex criminal legal theories while depriving defendants the opportunity
to defend themselves.
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